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Abstract 
 
Research within the social sciences has attempted to explain what 
individuals perceive, why they perceive it the way that they do and what 
are their attitudes, intentions and behavior. This issue is at the root of 
the contention that surrounds many environmental issues, with 
individuals worrying about some risks that dramatically exceed the 
danger they actually pose while ignoring others. Moreover, this fact of the 
non-rational element in policy decision-making has led researchers to 
study how to effectively communicate with a public that is emotionally 
driven. Using the 2010 General Social Survey, this paper attempts to re-
assess the bases of environmental concern and why it matters for public 
policy. This paper highlights the significance of social psychological 
factors in influencing environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior 
and how policy decision makers can benefit through a localized discourse 
when communicating risks or formulating public policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this study is two-fold: to examine the social 
structural and social psychological bases of environmental attitudes, 
intentions and behavior in the U.S. in 2010 as well as its influence on 
regulatory and policy decision-making. Increasingly, government 
decision-makers must understand what individuals perceive, why they 
perceive it the way that they do, and what are their attitudes, intentions 
and behavior. Moreover, government and experts need to effectively 
communicate policy decisions to an emotionally driven public. This 
process was articulated succinctly by U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Breyer in his lecture, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Toward 
Effective Risk Regulation.” Justice Breyer points out how public 
perceptions drive the U.S. Congress; Congress enacts guidelines for 
regulators and administrators; and regulations guide public perceptions 
(Breyer, 1993). Thus, this vicious cycle is underscored by the difficulty of 
balancing scientific analysis, political pressures, and an emotionally 
driven public in a world of rapidly changing technology and risks. 
Moreover, public perceptions are deeply embedded in our governing 
mechanisms.  This study seeks to identify some of the contributing 
factors that influence this process and to make recommendations on how 
our governing institutions can more effectively work with citizens to 
communicate risk and strengthen environmental policy.  
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 While this cyclical process may be evident to any individual 
familiar with how the American political system ought to work, it does 
not fully describe what actually happens. For example, public opinion 
polls show that many citizens do not put faith in our elected officials or 
governing institutions due to a lack of transparency. Additionally, there 
have been group-specific declines in public trust in science (Gauchat, 
2012). Therefore, it is ironic that while the public may not trust 
government institutions, nor the supporting science, both are seen as the 
most responsible for the causes and therefore for solving the problems 
(Wildavsky, 1979).  
In the environmental field, there exists polarization and contention 
about the impact of environmental risks due to the fact that individuals 
tend to only respond to those that they can perceive (Slovic et al., 1979). 
Moreover, numerous studies have suggested that there is an inherent 
gap between individuals’ environmental attitudes, intentions and 
behavior, and the influence of internal, external, and situational factors 
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). Lastly, many past studies have sought to 
identify who fears what and why, and in so doing, attempt to understand 
in what way our governmental institutions can more effectively assess, 
manage, and communicate risk and reward (or cost and benefit) 
information to citizens. 
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The Human Element 
Past literature in cognitive psychology also points to the fact that 
the public misperceives many environmental and technological risks. 
Many of us are more concerned with some risks than the evidence 
warrants (e.g. pesticides, genetically modified foods, nuclear radiation), 
and less concerned with risks that pose significant dangers (e.g. climate 
change and particulate pollution). Contributing to this perception is 
partly due to the fact that individuals rely on judgmental rules, or 
heuristics, to reduce what is a difficult mental task into simpler terms. 
As such, when fact and values must be balanced, it is usually values 
which drive our intentions and behavior. 
Likewise, literature in the fields of sociology and anthropology 
reveal that individuals use orienting dispositions, or worldviews, to make 
sense out of complex information (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). They 
posit that mental frameworks are not solely models of individual 
cognition, but correspond to deeply held values and beliefs regarding 
society, its functioning, and its potential fate. What is evident is that 
individuals act within the framework of bounded rationality, making 
decisions based on limited information. 
The reality of the human element in public policy decision-making 
requires acknowledging the limits of public rationality.  Moreover, 
effective democratic governance is grounded in the transmission of 
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information between professionals and the public, known as risk 
communication. As the field of risk communication has grown over the 
last several decades, this process has evolved into not just the movement 
of information, but debate and participation. Therefore, public concerns 
and judgments are a fundamental aspect of risk regulation and 
environmental policy. However, to what extent is the relationship 
between the two groups sufficient? Is the goal to transfer information to 
create a more informed citizenry? Should governing institutions not just 
inform, but influence, behavior? While the goal of risk communication 
seeks to bridge the gap between public and professional risk perception, 
its intended purpose remains the same: developing an environmental 
ethic that seeks expertise based solutions to mutually defined problems 
(O'Leary et al., 1999). 
Empirical Analysis 
This study will look to further develop insight into the behavioral 
and social aspects of environmental concern based on the following: (a) 
An empirical analysis examining environmental attitudes, intentions and 
behavior in the U.S. in 2010 as a re-assessment of the study by Dietz et 
al. (1998) and (b) current regulatory implications based on these 
findings. This analysis will seek to further explain the human element in 
the regulatory process and further elaborate on the context in which 
individuals develop concern for the environment based on the following: 
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general worldviews and ideology about humanity and the environment; 
specific attitudes, beliefs and cognitions about environmental issues; and 
environmentally relevant behavior and intentions.  Overall, this analysis 
will highlight the growing importance of social psychological factors in 
influencing our attitudes, intentions and behavior related to the 
environment. 
CHAPTER 2: THE BASES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 
 Understanding public perceptions and how they influence 
intentions and behavior is a fundamental component of effective policy 
decision-making. Moreover, understanding how individuals perceive their 
own and collective relationship with the environment, evaluate risk and 
analyze choices is imperative towards more effective public policy and a 
more informed public. This chapter will explain the two main streams of 
research that have developed to explain environmental concern: social 
structural explanations of environmental concern and social 
psychological influences of environmental concern.  
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Social Structural Influences 
Social structural influences have been examined extensively by 
researchers in their connection to environmentalism. Also called socio-
demographic variables, these variables represent common structures 
between various social positions. These studies share, and have 
expanded upon, many common hypotheses about what influences 
environmental attitudes, intentions, and behavior.  
The strongest predictors of environmental attitudes have been age 
and years of education. Studies have suggested that younger individuals 
were more likely to have reported engaging in environmental behaviors 
than older individuals (Hines et al., 1986). Other studies found that 
age/cohort effects are stronger predictors than period effects, with the 
more recent cohorts being more environmentally conscious (Kanagy, 
Humphrey & Firebaugh, 1994; as cited in Dietz et al., 1998). Likewise, 
more years of education led to an increase in knowledge about 
environmental issues, yet not to an increase in environmental behavior 
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002).  
Other factors such as race and gender have been less consistent, 
but still utilized in several studies. Studies have found that blacks have a 
greater concern for the environment than whites relative to other public 
issues. However, blacks are less likely to say that they will take political 
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action on these issues since many other issues compete for their time 
and resources (Mohai, 1990). 
The relationship between gender and concern for the environment 
has been studied the most extensively in comparison to the other social 
structural variables (Stern et al., 1993). Overall, women are generally 
found to be more concerned than men. One theory involves aspects of 
parenthood (Hamilton, 1985; as cited in Dietz et al., 1998). It is generally 
assumed that maternity motivates women to be more conscious of the 
harmful effects posed by environmental hazards. Other theories have 
included labor force participation and ethical socialization (Blocker & 
Eckberg, 1997; Stern et al., 1995). Additionally, studies found that 
women usually have less extensive environmental knowledge than men, 
but are more emotionally engaged, show more concern about 
environmental destruction, believe less in technological solutions, and 
are more willing to change their behavior (Lehman, 1999; as cited in 
Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). However, other studies have found gender to 
have no significant association with environmental attitudes (Hines et al., 
1986). 
Religion also has been extensively examined in relation to 
environmental attitudes. Most of the research in this area has found a 
weak-negative relationship between environmentalism and identity with 
a religious sect (Hand & Van Liere, 1984). Political ideology and party 
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identification are also associated with social structural influences of 
environmental attitudes. Generally, it has been found that the more 
liberal and Democratic leaning an individual is, the more likely he or she 
is to have increased environment conscious attitudes, and more likely to 
engage in environmental intentions and behavior.  
Social Psychological Factors 
The other stream of research studies has linked environmentalism 
to social psychological factors such as attitudes, beliefs, values and 
worldviews. These are generally factors related to personality 
characteristics, including the perceptions that individuals have of 
themselves and others (Hines et al., 1986). Generally, each of these 
broad values and attitudes are predictive of specific ones, and that the 
most important social psychological factor depends upon the specific 
behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).  
Economic orientation behavior refers to an individual's cost 
consciousness and concern about the economic impacts of certain 
responsible environmental behaviors and/or regulations (Hines et al., 
1986). Research studies examining willingness-to-pay for public goods 
have found that making a personal contribution of money, support for 
political action, and rating the importance of a problem are 
measurements of how important the issue is to the individual 
(Kahneman, 1993). Thus, this subjective preference is often driven by the 
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values one associates to that given action. Additionally, willingness-to- 
pay is more likely when human, rather than natural harm is the source. 
However, when human action is the cause of the problem, intent is 
important. For example, intentional harm inflicted by arsonists is more 
upsetting than pesticide runoff. Conversely, when the cause of the harm 
is natural, surprise is important: unexpected disasters (drought) are 
more upsetting than the process of natural decay. 
Locus of control represents an individual’s perception of whether 
or not he or she has the ability to bring about change through his or her 
own behavior. This includes external locus of control – attribute change 
to forces beyond yourself – and internal locus of control – believe that 
your activities are likely to have an impact. Other internal factors 
including motivation, environmental knowledge and awareness, values, 
and emotional involvement are frequently referenced in the social 
psychological literature.  
Motivation, defined as the reason for a behavior or a strong 
stimulus around which behavior is organized, is influenced by primary 
motives, the larger motives that let us engage in a whole set of behaviors 
(e.g. such as altruistic and social values), which are often covered up by 
the more immediate, selective motives, that evolve around one’s own 
needs (e.g. being comfortable, saving money and time). These motives 
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can be influencedby a willingness to act based on knowledge or values, 
or are the result of the formation of habit.  
Most researchers agree that environmental knowledge is not a 
significant predictor of environmental behavior. Likewise, people with 
high levels of environmental awareness may not be willing to make bigger 
lifestyle sacrifices, but may be more willing to accept political changes 
that will enhance pro-environmental behavior such as higher fuel taxes 
or more stringent building codes (Diekman & Frazen, 1996; Lehman, 
1999; as cited in Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). However, environmental 
awareness, which has both a cognitive knowledge base and an affective 
perception base, has more predictive ability.  
Values shape much of our intrinsic motivation and are 
significantly influenced by our immediate social net (Fuherer et al., 1995; 
as cited in Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). Emotional involvement is the 
extent to which we have an affective relationship with the natural world. 
It is seen to be important in shaping our beliefs, values, and attitudes 
towards the environment. Moreover, experiential factors including affect, 
imagery, and values strongly influence risk perception and support for 
environmental policy issues (Leiserowitz, 2006). Other studies have 
examined acceptance of postmaterialist values as a means of ideology 
(Dunlap & Mertig, 1995, 1997). Postmaterialism is defined as a value 
orientation towards self-expression and quality of life over economic and 
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physical security. It has generally been found that acceptance of 
postmaterialistic values is positively associated with a general concern 
for the environment.  
Understanding the bases of environmental concern has generally 
focused on how social structural - common structures between social 
positions - and social psychological variables- how thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors are influenced by others - influence our attitudes, 
intentions and behavior. Through the previous research findings, 
researchers have established several theoretical frameworks to outline 
the process through which these variables operate.   
Theoretical Paradigms 
Two of the main theoretical paradigms established in the 
environmental behavior field include the norm-activation model 
(Schwartz, 1977) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980). The basic premise of the norm-activation model is that moral or 
personal norms are direct determinants of pro-social behavior. Norm-
activation depends on ascription of responsibility to the self for the 
undesirable consequences to others. These norms are caused by 
cognitive variables (e.g. awareness and knowledge about environmental 
problems), emotional (e.g. values and beliefs) and social (e.g. one's own 
behavior should will follow social norms). Ultimately, this theory 
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emphasizes beliefs about responsibility for causing or ability to alleviate 
threats to any valued object. 
 The other theoretical paradigm, the theory of planned behavior, is 
based on the rational evaluation of behavioral consequences and the 
normative beliefs concerning the prescription of others (Fig. 1). As such, 
attitudes influence behavioral intention, which influences behavior. 
Moreover, this theory stresses the importance of situational constraints 
when forming behavioral intention. It was found that in order to find a 
high correlation between attitude and behavior, the researcher had to 
measure the specific attitude toward that particular behavior. For 
example, it has been found that measuring ones attitude towards climate 
change is a poor predictor of driving habits. A more specific attitude 
measurement would lead to a higher correlation, but may lose the 
context of what was being asked (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Moreover, 
this theory relied on the assumption that people make systematic use of 
information available to them and are not controlled by unconscious 
motives or overpowering desire. Ultimately, individuals maximize utility 
to balance cost and benefit in their interest. Most researchers followed 
this model despite its assumption of rationality since the model was 
simple, clear, and provided a mathematical equation for testing. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual representation of the Theory of Reasoned Action. As presented in 
"Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). 
While both of these models provide insights into pro-environmental 
behavior, they fail to account for the fact that people often are greatly 
influenced by their cognitive architectures and the complexity of the 
environment in which they make decisions (Jones, 2002). As Herbert 
Simon states in his book Administrative Behavior, “rationality does not 
determine behavior…instead behavior is determined by the irrational and 
non-rational elements that bound the area of rationality" (Simon, 1945; 
p. 241). Essentially, we are bounded to make decisions based on the 
information that we have. In his Behavioral Theory of Choice, Simon 
outlines the principles of bounded rationality: A “long term” memory 
allows individuals to encode experiences into rules that respond to 
stimuli. Similarly, a “short term memory” categorizes features as relevant 
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or irrelevant. Next, individuals are significantly driven by emotion, which 
enables them to weigh how they respond to stimuli. For example, deeper 
concentration and thinking would be used when attention and emotion 
are aroused. If not, individuals are likely to rely on heuristics, or other 
orienting dispositions, to make sense out of the situation. Most 
individuals rely on this quick thinking and processing mechanism rather 
than on a deeper processing of evaluating facts and balancing values. 
Lastly, emotion enables us to identify with solutions encoded in memory, 
which individuals become attached to and thus rely on when faced with 
complex decisions. 
While this theory only partly explains why individuals behave the 
way they do, it further underscores the bases for emotionally driven 
behavior under uncertainty. Moreover, this theory highlights the notion 
that individuals respond differently to stimuli based on their cognitive 
type, thus underscoring how concepts of risk mean different things to 
different people.  
Psychometric Paradigm 
A growing field of literature in cognitive psychology has examined 
public risk-perception and decision-making (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeny, 1981; Slovic, 1987; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  According to Slovic et al. (1977, 1979), their 
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empirical testing demonstrated that two main factors influence individual 
risk perception: the dread risk factor, which includes factors such as 
calm-dread, voluntary-involuntary, controllable-uncontrollable, and 
catastrophic-not catastrophic attributes of risks; and the unknown risk 
factors, known-unknown to the individual, known-unknown science, and 
new-old attributes of risk. Thus, we find risks more acceptable that 
present low measures of dread and are more familiar to us. In each of 
these cases, the subjective process of balancing our emotion and 
cognition allows us to make difficult choices quickly, often ignoring the 
facts. 
In one of their most well known studies, Slovic et al. (1979) 
examined how educated lay people estimated 41 causes of death in the 
U.S (Fig 2.). First, while individuals had a good idea of the frequency of 
most causes of death, they tended to underestimate the differences in the 
likelihood of the most and least frequent causes of death. Likewise, they 
overestimated the relative likelihood of those causes of death that are 
unusually visible, sensational, and easy to imagine (e.g. homicides and 
accidents) (Slovic et al., 1979; Fischoff et al., 1981).   
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Figure 2. Relationship between judged frequency and the actual number of deaths per year 
for 41 causes of death. If judged and actual deaths were equal, the data would fall on the 
straight line. The points, and the curved line fitted to them, represent the average 
responses of a large number of lay people. Thus, less frequently occurring risks are 
overestimated, and more frequently occurring risks are underestimated. As presented in 
"Judged Frequency of Lethal Events” (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). 
These causes of death tend to be the hazards that are often most 
over reported in the news.  Similar findings were found with estimates of 
fatalities of various technological hazards (Slovic et al, 1979). Moreover, 
these samples have indicated that people often tend to think of 
themselves as immune to hazards. For example, they see themselves as 
better-than-average drivers, more likely than average to live past 80, less 
likely than average to be injured by tools they operate, and so forth 
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(Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic, 1987). Other studies have shown that 
individuals are roughly 1000 times more likely to accept “voluntary” risks 
in comparison to “involuntary” risks. Overall, their findings indicate that 
cognitive limitations coupled with anxiety causes uncertainties to be 
denied, risks to be distorted, and statements of fact to be believed with 
unwarranted confidence.  
The significant contribution from the cognitive psychological 
literature is that it has provided explanations for judgmental biases.  
Moreover, the subjective, instinctive, facts-and-feelings nature of our 
perceptions has evolved into emotional cues and cognitive shortcuts. As 
a result, individuals rely on judgmental rules, or heuristics, to reduce the 
complexity of the issue to terms based on what they heard or observed. 
This allows individuals to quickly turn partial information into quick, 
easy to imagine choices.  
These heuristics include: availability, which enables people to 
judge events as likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or 
recall; overconfidence, people’s insensitivity to the validity of the 
assumptions to which their judgments are based; desire for certainty, 
people deny uncertainty in dealing with possible gains and losses, thus 
representing an additional source of certainty; representiveness, 
assessing the degree of similarity, rather than dissimilarity, between two 
objects; and anchoring or adjustment, a natural starting place or anchor 
18 
 
is used as a first approximation to the judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Slovic, 1987).  
Further studies in the cognitive psychological literature have 
examined decision problems, or choice amongst alternatives, that 
systematically violate the requirements of consistency and coherence 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This research found that as a result of the 
imperfection of human perception, changes of perspective often reverse 
the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of 
options. For example, in this study the following question was asked to 
152 students: 
“Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the 
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the program are as 
follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%) 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved, and 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. (28%) 
The majority of choice in this problem is risk adverse. Although the 
two programs will save the same amount of people, Program A is more 
attractive. 
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A second group of students (155 students) were asked a similar 
question with a different formulation of the alternative programs: 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. (22%) 
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 
2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (78%) 
The majority choice in problem 2 is risk taking: the certain death of 
400 people is less acceptable then the equal expected value of the 2/3 
chance 600 will die. Thus, choices involving gains are often risk averse 
and choices involving losses are often risk taking. Moreover, their findings 
suggest that decisions are not focused upon final outcomes, but upon 
incremental stages in a complex process. As such, what has gone before is 
treated as a boundary behind which one ignores. 
The practical application of this study's findings are presented in 
"Informed Choice or Regulated Risk? Lessons from a Study in Radon 
Communication" by Johnson et al. (1988). The authors tested the 
assumption that information programs will motivate people to voluntarily 
and rationally reduce risks associated with Radon.1 They based this 
assumption on the logic that individuals find consent more ethical when 
                                                                
1
Radon causes more cancer deaths per year - 5,000 to 20,000 - than other pollutants 
under its jurisdiction. It is a colorless, odorless, gas that occurs naturally.  It is 
relatively unfamiliar to individuals - both its origins and health risks - and unlike most 
environmental hazards, does not have an entity to blame.  Due to the fact that most 
radon exposure occurs in people's homes, it led EPA to use risk communication 
strategies to reduce risk. 
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it is actual and explicit (e.g. individual decisions), rather than when it is 
implicit or hypothetical (e.g. centralized decisions). However, the authors 
argue that ethical issues cannot be avoided when content, format, and 
tone of informative messages affect how people understand the 
information (p.248).  They found that differences in information 
treatment do influence learning, formation of risk perceptions, and 
intended and recommended behavior, as the previous experiment 
suggested. For example, framing outcomes in particular ways to some 
individuals may lead to an emotional response signifying loss. Likewise, 
the framing of acts and outcomes can also reflect acceptance or rejection 
of responsibility for particular consequences (p.256). Ultimately, their 
findings indicated that different groups respond to the same message 
differently.  
Theories of risk perception from a cognitive psychological context 
explain the caution individuals and risk communicators should take in 
interpreting and presenting information. Moreover, the extent to which 
individuals rely on heuristics in their decision-making process has 
significant implications for risk communication. However, many of the 
choices individuals are faced with are not conducted in research labs like 
many of the cognitive psychological experiments previously mentioned. 
Moreover, these findings cannot be attributed universally across 
individuals or groups.  In matters of risk perception, some researchers 
argue that we act less as individuals, and more as social beings with 
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internalized pressures and delegated decision-making institutions 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Therefore, our values and beliefs are not 
individual constructs, but deeply embedded collective mindsets about 
society and its functioning. Thus, we choose to live without knowing all 
of the risks that we face, following social rules about what to ignore.  
Cultural Theory 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), risk is best 
understood in terms of the plural social construction of the meaning 
attached to the risk, which they have defined as cultural theory. As such, 
competing cultures apply different meanings to situations, events, 
objects, and relationships. Therefore, individuals are embedded in a 
social structure which shapes their values, attitudes, and beliefs (Dake, 
1991, 1992).  
Cultural theory accounts for the social construction of risk in 
terms of three linked domains: cultural biases, shared values and beliefs 
that justify a way of behaving; social relations, a pattern of interpersonal 
relationships: hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, fatalists, and 
autonomous; and behavioral strategies (Dake 1991,1992). Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) developed these interpersonal relationships using the 
two central dimensions of sociality: control and social commitment (Fig. 
3). These relational forms, together with cultural biases, constitute what 
is or is not considered a risk. According to Dake (1991, 1992), these 
22 
 
social constructions of risk can be described in terms of “worldviews”, 
which are general attitudes about the world and its social organization.  
Each worldview represents a different "rationality"; a set of pre-
suppositions about the ideal nature of society which leads groups to 
perceive different risks and policy options (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
Moreover, these worldviews serve as orientating dispositions which help 
individuals navigate through complex situations.  
Four basic worldviews, based on interpersonal relationships, guide 
individual attitudes toward social relations: hierarchists, place a great 
deal of trust in expertise, dislike social deviance, and maintain the 
establishment of structure; they will accept risks as long as decisions 
about those risks are justified by experts; individualists, value individual 
achievement, support self-regulation, believe people should be rewarded 
materially for their achievements, and dislike rules that constrain 
individual initiative; they see risks as opportunities; egalitarians, are 
distrustful of institutions and their expertise, and see selfishness and 
greed as obstacles to a world in which wealth and power should be 
widely distributed; they oppose risks that will inflict danger upon many 
people or future generations and distrust the advice of a small group of 
experts; and fatalists, who see nature as unpredictable and 
uncontrollable, and favor isolation and resigned controls on their 
behavior; they try not to worry about things that they can do nothing 
about (Dake 1991, 1992). 
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Figure 3. This chart demonstrates the group (control)/grid (social commitments) 
dimensionality to the four basic worldviews. Also, it explains the "myths of nature" each 
worldview follows. As presented in "Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology, and 
Social Choice" (Schwartz & Thompson, 1990). 
Through each of these separate worldviews, perceptions of risk are 
identified as a construct, or "rationality", of the socio-cultural context in 
which a decision is made. From a public policy perspective, 
understanding these patterns of belief is essential to how individuals 
perceive the social implications of the risk. For example, 
environmentalists may blame "the system" for environmental damage; 
corporations may call for market controls (e.g cap-and-trade); or 
bureaucratic organizations may call for top-down management 
(Thompson et al., 1990, as cited in Dake, 1992). According to cultural 
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theory, and in an attempt to explain how environmental risks are 
perceived, one must look at the social and cultural context of how that 
issue, or risk, is defined.  
The cognitive psychological literature attempts to explain the 
complex nature of environmental risks, and the difficulty individuals 
have in making a "rational" assessment of the multiple dimensions they 
present. As such, researchers have established several cognitive 
shortcuts individuals take to turn complex information into the quick 
choices they make day by day. From a public policy perspective, both 
government and experts have attempted to mend this perception gap 
through access to education and information under the assumption that 
this will enable individuals to make better decisions. However, matters of 
who fears what and why are not universal among the public. In 
explaining who fears what and why, cultural theory explains how deeply 
held beliefs and values about social relations in groups greatly affect 
their risk perceptions. As such, researchers have stated that individuals 
act less as individuals and more as social beings. They have internalized 
social pressures and delegated decision-making processes to institutions, 
or any social structure or mechanism governing the behavior of a set of 
individuals (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1986; p.80). In contrast to the 
cognitive psychological literature which states that individuals are 
essentially isolated from social or cultural influences in their use of 
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simplifying mechanisms, cultural theory states that these institutions act 
as such mechanisms.  
Regulatory Issues 
Predicting risks requires predictions of events in a world where 
many potentially relevant, rapidly changing circumstances entail the 
expertise of many different individuals to reach a conclusion (Breyer, 
1993). Therefore, government and experts are faced with the 
responsibility to bridge the assessment of risks as well as manage a 
political discourse around which risks are acceptable to society. As such, 
both researchers and professionals have found great difficulty in linking 
the social world - "demosphere" - of risk perceptions and the scientist’s 
rational, ideal decision-making based in probabilistic thinking - 
"technosphere" (Plough & Krimsky, 1987). For many years, technical 
rationality assumed that experts can act independently of popular 
culture in structuring risk analysis, whereas cultural knowledge was 
assumed to adapt to the rationality of experts. However, regulating risks 
in a complex environment with an emotionally charged public continues 
to evolve with social, political, and economic changes. 
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Figure 4. This table lists the aspects of technical and cultural rationality in the risk 
regulating process. As presented in "The Emergence of Risk Communication Studies: Social 
and Political Context" (Plough & Krimsky, 1987; p.230). 
Most of the academic literature that examined the regulation of 
risk falls into three main categories: Risk management, risk assessment, 
and risk communication. In matters dealing with how the public 
perceives risk, risk communication has been the field that has bridged 
the technical and social aspects of risk. Moreover, it has had significant 
influence on how individuals formulate environmental attitudes, 
intentions and behavior. Therefore, examining the structural and 
psychological bases of environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior 
lends to how risk regulators can interact in a society that demands a 
voice in the social and political discourse of environmental risks.  
As the technical component of the regulatory system, risk 
assessment is designed to measure the risk (hazard x exposure) 
Technical Rationality Cultural Rationality
Trust in scientific methods, explanations; evidence appeals to 
authority and expertise Trust in political cutlure and democratic process
Appeal to authority and expertise Appeal to folk wisdom, perr groups, and traditions
Boundaries of analysis are narrow and reductionist Boundaries of analysis are broad; include the use of analogy and historical precedent
Risks are depersonalized Risks are personalized
Emphasis on statistical variation and probability Emphasis on the impacts of risk on the family and community
Appeal to consistency  and universiality Focus on particularity; less concerned about consistency of approach
Where there is controversy in science, resolution follows status Popular responses to scientific differences do not follow the prestige principle
Those impacts that cannot be uttered are irrelevant Unanticipated or unarticulated risks are relevant
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associated with the substance. There are four key parts to this process: 
Identifying the potential hazard; drawing a dose response curve; 
estimating the amount of human exposure; and categorizing the results 
(Breyer, 1993). Research over the last several decades has found that 
regulatory agencies allocate a great deal of resources to regulate even the 
smallest of risks, largely due to the over-reaction of the public. In fact, 
the reason U.S. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote his book, "Breaking the 
Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation," was due to the 
disputes, uncertainties, and costs associated with the science 
surrounding the risk. None the less, the technical aspect of risk 
regulation is not free of politics. Once the risk is assessed, regulators 
must decide what the assessment reveals, a process known as risk 
management. Essentially, this becomes a balance between how the 
regulation will diminish one risk, while at the same time produce 
attention to different risks.  
Therefore, the extent to which risk assessment and risk 
management outcomes are relayed to the public is a matter of risk 
communication. This aspect of risk regulation informs individuals about 
the existence, nature, form, severity, or acceptability of risks (Breyer, 
1993). Other definitions include, "an interactive process of exchange of 
information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions" 
(O'Leary et al., 1990; p.166). Risk communication grew out of the need 
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for risk managers to gain public acceptance for their policies guided by 
risk assessments. 
Its origins can be traced to the height of the nuclear power 
industry, which, after risk assessments warranted it as a relatively safe 
technology, the lay public grew increasingly suspicious. Experts wanted 
to understand why the public did not see the nuclear industry through 
their "rational" eyes. Peters and Slovic (1996) found that perceptions of 
nuclear energy were largely determined by affect (positive or negative 
feelings about specific objects, ideas or images) and cognition. Thus, 
what for many experts was deemed “fact” was overshadowed by the 
“facts-as-feelings” nature of the public. 
The success of risk communication must be measured to some 
degree by the extent to which popular attitudes reflect technical 
rationality, and the extent to which popular behavior conforms to 
technocratic values (Plough & Krimsky, 1987). Therefore, to mend the 
discrepancy between technical risk assessment and public perceptions, a 
cultural approach must be adapted that bridges expert and public 
approaches to a risk event. These approaches can be logical and 
coherent on their own terms, but may exhibit differences in how the 
problem is articulated with respect to the factors relevant to the analysis, 
and who the experts are (Fischhoff et al, 1981).  
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPERICAL METHODS 
Data and Measures 
Through understanding the social structural and social 
psychological bases of environmental concern, as well as how risks are 
perceived and communicated, the public often displays non-rational 
judgment. Moreover, this bias is influenced by the values and beliefs 
individuals attribute to the environment. To test the theoretical findings 
presented in the previous chapters, this analysis will use the 2010 
General Social Survey (GSS) and re-assess the findings in Dietz et al. 
(1998) to further illustrate the bases of environmental concern and the 
policy implications of these findings.2 
The 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) interviewed a random 
national sample of 2,044 respondents through the months of February, 
March and April of 2010. This data set was used due to its reliability, 
replicability, as well as representation of the U.S. population in 2010.  
Following the previous study by Dietz et al. (1998), this study excluded 
those groups with relatively small numbers. Individuals whose race was 
coded as “other” (184 respondents), or who reported religious 
denomination other than Protestant, Catholic, or no religion were 
excluded from the sample.  
                                                                
2
The Dietz et al. (1998) study tested the social structural and social psychological bases 
of environmental concern using data from the 1993 General Social Survey. 
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 Based on the sample, the General Social Survey included 54 items 
in the 2010 environment module which were developed to measure 
variables that are connected to the theoretical constructs within the 
environmental attitude and behavior literature. These constructs include 
social structural as well as social psychological influences on 
environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior. Each of these 
constructs will be compared separately within tables to control for the 
predicative power of each. They will then be combined to examine the 
extent to which these associations are maintained. This will allow for the 
strength of each theoretical construct to be compared. Additionally, the 
effects of social psychological variables within social structural groups 
will show the extent to which environmental beliefs are relevant within 
social groups. 
Items that will be measured include: behavioral indicators 
(behavioral intention and past behavior); attitudes, beliefs, and 
cognitions; general worldviews about humanity and the environment; 
and social-structural items. These items were linked following a principal 
component analysis to determine the dimensionality of each group. This 
method reduced the number of predictor variables to a smaller number 
of dimensions. After rotating the factors using a varimax rotation, the 
factors determined the structure of each group. Those items with a factor 
loading above .40 were used to create the appropriate scales. The scales 
that were constructed followed those used in the Dietz et al. (1998) study 
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and look to re-assess the extent to which these theoretical constructs are 
conceptually representative and maintained in the 2010 U.S. population.  
Behavioral Indicators 
Behavioral Indicators Definition Mean S.D. N 
     
Willingness to Sacrifice (WTS)1 How willing are you to make 
personal sacrifices for 
environmental quality? 
2.84 
 
1.08 1302 
Consumer Behavior (CB)2 How often do you use products or 
services which are 
environmentally friendly? 
2.19 
 
0.65 1252 
Sign a Petition on Environmental Issue (SP)3 In the last five years, have you 
signed a petition on an 
environmental issue? 
0.17 
 
0.37 1381 
Member of Environmental Group (GG)3 Are you a member of any group 
whose aim is to preserve or 
protect the environment? 
0.06 0.23 1400 
Environmental Spending (ES)4 Do you think we are spending too 
much, too little, or the right 
amount on improving and 
protecting the environment? 
2.44 0.71 960 
Protect the Environment (PE)5 Do you think government should 
have a role in deciding how 
people/business protect the 
environment? 
0.75 0.35 984 
     
1Scale range from 1 (not willing at all) to 5 (very willing)  
2Scale range from 1 (never) to 4 (always)  
3Scale range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes)  
4Scale range from 1 (too much) to 3 (too little)  
5Scale range from 0 (government let people/business decide) to 1 (government should pass laws) 
 
The 2010 GSS environment module contained 13 questions 
focused on past behavior and intention. Two of the questions in this 
category were not included: if the respondent had participated in a 
demonstration about an environmental issue; and if the respondent had 
given money to an environmental group. The former was omitted based 
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on the analysis by Dietz et al. (1998) which questioned the validity of the 
item. The latter was omitted due to the low number of respondents (258). 
Based on the remaining 11 questions, factor analysis sorted the items 
into the following categories: willingness to sacrifice (WTS), consumer 
behavior (CB), and political/collective behavior (SP and GG). 
 Each of these items was recoded so that a positive score reflects a 
pro-environmental position. The collective or political behavior category 
had low alpha reliability (.420), so each item was analyzed separately. 
These items asked respondents whether they are a member of a green 
group (GG) and if they had signed a petition on an environmental issue 
(SP). The WTS and CB scales, as well as the alpha loadings, are provided 
in the appendix. Some respondents indicated within the CB items that 
they did not have access to certain products or services. These 
respondents were omitted from the scale along with those who responded 
“don’t know.”  
 Two additional items were analyzed on government environmental 
spending (ES) and role of government in environmental protection (PE). 
The item on ES was a split ballot experiment and only one ballot 
measure was analyzed, thus the lower sample size relative to the other 
items tested. This item asked respondents if government is spending too 
much, too little, or just the right amount on improving and protecting the 
environment. Additionally, the measure on role of government in 
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environmental protection (PE) provides further examination of 
respondent’s political behavior. These two variables, one in regards to 
“business”, the other “people”, asked respondents, “If you had to choose, 
which one of the following would be closest to your views? Government 
should let (people/business) decide for themselves how to protect the 
environment, even if it means they don’t always do the right thing, or 
government should pass laws to make (people/business) protect the 
environment, even if it interferes with (people/business) rights to make 
their own decisions.” These two questions were combined to create a new 
item where a higher score represented a pro-law position.  Not only does 
this question cover the balance between the state and the individual, but 
it provides further explanatory power beyond the environmental spending 
item.  Lastly, all of the categories are separated between past behaviors 
(CB, GG and SP) and behavioral intentions (WTS, ES, and EP). 
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Attitudes, Beliefs, and Cognitions 
Attitudes, Beliefs and Cognitions Definition Mean S.D. N 
     
Awareness of Consequences (AOC)1 Do you believe these activities have 
negative consequences for the 
environment? 
3.66 0.69 1216 
Locus of Control (Internal) (LCI)2 It is just too difficult for someone like me 
to do something about the environment. 
3.52 1.12 1362 
Locus of Control (External) (LCE)2 There is no point in doing what I can for 
the environment unless others do the 
same. 
3.43 1.13 1379 
Know Solution (KS)3 How much do you feel you know about the 
solutions of environmental problems? 
2.52 1.02 1357 
Know Cause (KC)3 How much do you feel you know about the 
causes of environmental problems? 
2.94 1.07 1359 
     
1
Scale range from 1 (not dangerous at all for the environment) to 5 (very dangerous for the environment) 
2
Scale range from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
3
Scale range from 1(know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal) 
The GSS consisted of 10 attitude, belief, and cognition items of 
which six were used in the factor analysis. These items created a six 
variable scale with an alpha reliability of .806 (see appendix). These 
questions looked at whether six kinds of environmental activities have 
negative consequences for the environment. The scale was recoded so 
that higher scoresrepresented belief in greater awareness of 
consequences (AOC). Beliefs about the consequences of such activities 
have been identified as strong predictors of environmental behavior. 
Studies including Schwartz’s (1977) theory of moral norm activation as 
well as Dunlap & Van Liere’s (1978) new ecological paradigm measured 
these items relative to environmental concern.  
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This block also included measures of internal (LCI) and external 
(LCE) locus of control. These items represent an individual’s perception 
of whether he or she has the ability to bring changes through their own 
behavior. Individuals with a strong LCI believe that their actions can 
bring about change. People with a strong LCE feel that their actions are 
insignificant, and feel that change can only be brought about by others. 
LCI was measured based on the question “it is just too difficult for 
someone like me to do something about the environment.” The response 
was based on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. 
LCE was measured based on the question “there is no point in doing 
what I can for the environment unless others do the same.” The response 
was based on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” 
(see appendix). In both variables, a higher score represented a pro-
environmental position, signifying that they have the ability to do 
something about the environment. 
Also included was a measure of environmental knowledge and 
awareness. In the study by Hines et al. (1987), their meta-analysis of 
environmental behavior indicated knowledge of issues and knowledge of 
action strategies as primary indicators of environmental attitudes, 
intentions and behavior. Two aspects of knowledge were measured: how 
much the respondent knows about the cause of environmental problems 
(KC) and how much the respondent knows about solutions (KS) to 
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environmental problems.3 To measure KC, the question was used, “how 
much do you feel you know about the causes of these sort of 
environmental problems? Answers were based on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from “know nothing at all” to “knowing a great deal.” To measure 
KS, the questions asked, “how much do you feel you know about 
solutions to these sort of environmental problems?” Answers were based 
on a 5-point scale, ranging from “know nothing at all” to “knowing a 
great deal.” Cause and solution were included separately since they each 
have a predictive ability towards behavior. For example, given high levels 
of knowledge about the causes of environmental problems, an individual 
may be more likely to strengthen their environmental behavior to offset 
possible risks, or conversely, individuals will decrease their 
environmental behavior if they are certain on the causes of 
environmental problems, thus realizing there is little they can do. 
Additionally, Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) state that an increase in 
environmental awareness leads to individuals being less likely to make 
bigger lifestyle sacrifices, but more willing to accept political changes that 
will enhance pro-environmental behavior.  This logic follows with 
knowing solutions to environmental problems as well.4 
                                                                
3These environmental problems include: air pollution, chemicals and pesticides, water 
shortage, water pollution, nuclear waste, domestic waste disposal, climate change, 
genetically modified food, and using up our natural resources.  
4
The correlations between KC and KS do not fully support this hypothesis. WTS 
(B=.227, B=.190, respectively) and CB (B=.242, B=.222, respectively) – both larger 
lifestyle sacrifices – show stronger positive correlations then GG (B=.113, B=.097, 
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General Worldview and Ideology about Humanity and the Environment 
General Worldview and Ideology about 
Humanity and the Environment 
        Definition Mean S.D. N 
     
Progress versus the Environment (PB)1 Trade-offs between 
progress or economic 
growth and the 
environment. 
2.95 1.19 1373 
Fragility of Nature (FB)1 Human interaction with 
natural environment. 
2.87 0.79 1328 
Postmaterialism (PM)2 Value orientation 
towards self-expression 
and quality of life over 
economic and physical 
security. 
1.52 0.99 1166 
1
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)  
2
Scale range from 0 (none of America's priorities should be postmaterialistic values) to 3 (America's 
highest priorities should be postmaterialistic values) 
The General Social Survey contained five items which were used to 
judge general ideas about the nature of human-environment 
relationships. Through factor analysis, two categories were created: 
whether economic progress is environmentally harmful (PB), whether 
human activity is harmful to the environment (FB) and post materialism 
(PM). The first category was “progress vs. environment” (PB) which had 
an alpha reliability of .621. Some studies found that belief in growth 
influences individuals to be less inclined to make personal sacrifices 
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). The item was coded so that a higher score 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
respectively), ES (B=.084, B=.074, respectively), and PE (B=.145, B=.099, respectively) – 
all of which are larger political changes that will enhance behavior. SP (B=.214, B=.205, 
respectively) is the only political change that is correlated to a similar strength as larger 
lifestyle and sacrifices.  
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represents a pro-environmental position. The other factor represented 
respondents view about human interaction with the environment. This 
was interpreted as representing “fragility of nature” (FB) beliefs. This 
factor had an alpha reliability of .516. This item was recoded so that 
higher scores represent a pro-environmental position. Both of these 
factors are theoretically linked to cultural theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Dake, 1991, 1992). Scales and factor loadings for both of these 
categories are included in the appendix.  
The first factor, “progress vs. environment” (PB), conforms to the 
individualist belief that market forces will overcome environmental 
consequences. Moreover, this item is indicative of the current discourse 
around environmental issues. The second factor, “fragility of nature” 
(FB), shares with the first key myths of nature identified in the cultural 
theory of risk. This position is common with egalitarians, representing 
high levels of concern about environmental risk, and also increased 
participation in environmental movement organizations (Dake, 1992).5 
Another item that was measured and is also a measurement of 
ideology or worldview is post-materialism (PM). This item is established 
throughout the environmental behavior literature as a justification for 
environmental concern (Dunlap & Mertig, 1997). The question in the 
                                                                
5
The correlation between FB and AOC was a statistically significant moderate-positive 
relationship (B=.373). However, the correlation between FB and GG was a non 
statistically significant weak-negative relationship (B= -.015). 
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GSS asked respondents to choose “the one thing you think should be 
America’s highest priority, the most important thing it should do. 
America should: (1) Maintain order in the nation; (2) give people more say 
in government decisions; (3) fight rising prices; (4) protect freedom of 
speech.” Following this question, there was a second question that asked 
respondents to choose the second most important item from the same 
list. The second and the fourth item were both considered post-
materialist values, while the first and the third are materialist. A scale 
was created by assigning two points if a post-materialist item was 
selected as a top priority and one point if it was given second priority, 
creating a scale 0-3. Therefore, a higher score yields stronger post-
materialist values.  
Social Structural Variables 
 The General Social Survey contained several variables to test the 
social structural influences of environmental attitudes, intentions and 
behavior. Variables including gender, race, age, income, and religion 
were recoded using dummy variables. In each item, the larger variable 
was used as the reference category. Gender was recoded as (1=Female) 
and race was recoded as (1=Black). Age was recoded to include three 
groups: Baby-boomers (between the ages of 45-65); Generation X 
(between the ages of 30-44); and Generation Y (<30 years old). Income 
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was recoded by using the median income of respondents ($50,000) as a 
midpoint (1=Below median income).  
Also included were measures for education, political ideology, and 
party identification. Education was a linear measure of years of 
education (0-20). Political Ideology was measured using a 7-point scale 
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. This variable was 
recoded so that higher scores represented a more liberal position. Due to 
the findings that suggest liberals are more likely to show higher levels of 
concern for the environment, and following the structure of Dietz et al. 
(1998), this item was renamed liberalism. Party identification was used 
to assess which political party the respondent identified with. Three 
dummy variables were created: (1=Democrat); (1= Republican); and 
(1=Independent).  
Variables for religion, religious strength, and spirituality were also 
used. Religion was recoded into dummy variables for the three most 
prominent denominations: (1=Protestant); (1=Catholic); and (1=No 
Religion). A measure of religious strength was also included based on the 
question “would you call yourself a strong….or not a very strong…?” The 
variable was recoded so that those that responded “strong” were coded 3, 
those responding “somewhat strong” were recoded 2, and those 
responding “not very strong” were recoded as 1. Individuals with no 
religious affiliation were recoded as 0. A measure of spirituality was also 
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measured using the question, “to what extent do you consider yourself a 
spiritual person?” The question consisted of a 4-point scale from “very 
spiritual” to “not spiritual at all.” This item was recoded so that higher 
scores represent a more spiritual person.  
Statistical Procedures 
 Ordered logistic regression (OLR) and bivariate logistic regression 
(BLR) was used to determine the predictive ability of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Both look to predict the change in 
the dependent variable for a unit change in the independent variable. 
OLR allows for the relative importance - logit regression coefficient - of 
the independent variable to be identified. BLR uses odds-ratios since the 
variable is dichotomous.  
 Other than SP and GG, all variables were tested using OLR. SP 
and GG were tested using BLR. For this analysis, there was not a need 
for standardized estimates since only statistical effects across columns 
were analyzed.  
 Also, the analysis consists of examining the coefficient of multiple 
determinations (Cox and Snell pseudo R2  for OLR and BLR). Similar to 
the R2 in OLS regression, this attempts to measure the percentage of 
total variation in the dependent variables that is explained by the 
variation in all the independent variables. This study follows the 
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understanding that environmental data is often skewed, as well as the 
fact that Dietz et al. (1998) did not find substantial differences in the 
results when outliers were deleted.6 Additionally, sample sizes for each of 
the variables and indexes vary due to the recoding techniques.   
 
                                                                
6
Individuals who are surveyed one-on-one have a tendency to exaggerate their 
environmental attitudes and behavior to conform to norm expectations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 1 
The Effect of Social Structural Variables on Behavior and Intention 
 Willingness 
to Sacrifice 
(WTS) 
Consumer 
Behavior 
(CB) 
Sign 
Petition 
(SP) 
Member 
of Group 
(GG) 
Environmental 
Spending 
(ES) 
Protecting the 
Environment 
(PE) 
Gender 
      
Male   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female -0.03  0.17*   0.55** 0.72 0.04 0.03 
Race       
Black -0.20* -0.25*  0.53* 0.35 -0.34* -0.09 
White 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age       
Baby Boomers  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation X  0.00 -0.17*  0.63* 1.11 0.08 -0.16 
Generation Y   0.07 -0.22* 1.10 0.78 0.17 -0.30* 
Income       
Above Median 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Below Median 
Income 
-0.01  0.10   0.57**  0.38* -0.01 0.04 
Education    0.05**   0.04**  1.16** 1.11 0.02   0.06** 
Liberalism       0.07*  0.10*  1.32**   1.55** 0.07 0.07 
Party Identification       
Democrat 0.06 0.04 1.19 0.97 0.10   0.13* 
Independent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Republican  -0.12**  -0.03 1.05 1.13 -0.16* -0.10 
Religion       
Protestant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Catholic  0.05    0.26** 1.31 0.80 -0.05 0.13 
No Religion 0.34 0.21 1.15 0.32 0.02 0.20 
Religious Strength -0.01 0.03 0.84 0.62 -0.06 0.05 
Spiritual Person 0.08   0.12**   1.39**  1.50*  0.05 -0.05 
R2   .10   .09 .10   .04    .07    .09 
N  835 817 868 879 599 633 
      
Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are 
interpreted as odds-ratios.  
*p<.10, **p<.05 
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In Table 1, the pseudo R2 of each dependent variable indicates that 
there remains significant explanatory power for behavioral intentions 
beyond the social structural variables.7 The findings from this table 
highlight the following insights into the effect of social structural 
variables on behavior and intention: 
 Education and Liberalism tend to be the strongest predictors of 
environmental behavior and intentions.  
 Religion and Religious strength is a weak predictor of 
environmental behavior and intention. However, an individual’s 
level of spirituality is a stronger predictor of past behavioral items.  
This set of variables explains (pseudo R2) between 4% and 10% of the 
variation in behavior and intention. Gender is related to CB and SP, with 
females more likely than males to engage in CB, but less likely than 
males to SP. Race shows a statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP and ES with 
blacks being less likely than whites to engage in each of these behavior 
and intentions.  
Age cohort shows a statistical effect on CB, SP and PE. Generation X 
(30-44) and Generation Y (< 30 years old) respondents are less likely to 
engage in CB than Baby Boomers (45-65). Generation X (30-44) 
                                                                
7
This is also due to the fact that anytime the dependent variable is a range of integers, 
R2 statistics are relatively low. 
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respondents are less likely than Baby Boomers (45-65) to SP; and 
Generation Y (< 30 years old) respondents are less likely to believe 
government should pass laws for individuals and businesses to protect 
the environment (PE).  
Income shows a statistical effect on SP and GG - both public 
behaviors. Below median income individuals are less likely than above 
median income individuals to engage in these past behaviors. It would 
seem that income would show a statistical effect on WTS and/or CB 
items. However, being that income is associated with political and/or 
collective groups implies further insight into the context in which these 
organizations target the public. 
Both education and liberalism are two of the strongest predictors 
among behavior and intentions. The more educated the respondent, the 
more likely they are to show a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP 
and PE. The more liberal the respondent, the more likely they are to 
show a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP and GG.  
Religion in this block only shows a statistical effect on CB, with 
Catholics more likely to engage in this behavior than Protestants. 
Religious strength does not show a statistically significant effect on any 
of the behavior or intention items mentioned.8 The item which measured 
                                                                
8
Religion and Religious Strength have a high correlation among Protestant (B=.512) and 
No Religion (B=-.864). Due to the high correlation, this may weaken the statistical 
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spirituality shows a positive statistical effect on CB, SP and GG. Lastly, 
party identification shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, ES and PE, 
with Republicans less likely than Independents to engage in WTS and 
ES. Democrats are found more likely than Independents to believe 
government should pass laws for businesses and individuals to protect 
the environment (PE).9 
Table 2 
The Effect of Social Psychological Variables on Behavior and 
Intention 
 Willingness 
to Sacrifice 
(WTS) 
Consumer 
Behavior 
(CB) 
Sign 
Petition 
(SP) 
Member 
of Group 
(GG) 
Environmental 
Spending 
(ES) 
Protecting the 
Environment 
(PE) 
      
Postmaterialism (PM) -0.01 -0.01   1.28** 1.23 -0.06  -0.19** 
Awareness of Consequences (AOC)    0.40**    0.50**   1.39** 1.16    0.55**   0.30** 
Progress Beliefs (PB)    0.24** 0.04   1.32** 1.32*    0.32**   0.27** 
Fragility Beliefs (FB)    0.19** 0.00 0.82 0.95 0.04 0.10 
Locus of Control (Internal) (LCI) 0.06 0.06   1.33** 1.20 0.10  0.12* 
Locus of Control (External) (LCE)  0.07* 0.05 1.14 1.10 -0.06 0.04 
Know Cause (KC)   0.11**  0.09*   1.37** 1.08 0.00 0.06 
Know Solution (KS) 0.07   0.13** 1.20 1.28 0.05 0.08 
R2  .24  .17   .11   .03  .20   .18 
N 950 906 969 981 507 746 
      
Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are 
interpreted as odds-ratios. 
*p<.10, **p<.05 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
significance of these variables. Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicated 
that No Religion and Religious Strength may pose multicollineartiy (Tolerance of .197 
and .201, respectively). As such, removing religious sects from the analysis would show 
that religious strength is statistically significant, and vice-versa. 
9
Party Identification and Political Ideology have a high correlation among Democrats 
(B=.426) and Republicans (B=-.465). Due to the high correlation, this may weaken the 
statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
indicated that multicollineraity is not a problem.  
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In Table 2, the pseudo R2 is significantly higher than Table 1, 
indicating the influence of social psychological variables on behavior and 
intention. The social psychological items tend to predict more in regards 
to behavioral intention (WTS, ES and PE) than in past behavior (CB, SP 
and GG). The findings from the table highlight the following insights: 
 Both AOC and PB are strong predictors of behavior and intention.  
This set of variables accounts for 3%-24% of the variance in 
behavioral indicators. PM shows a statistical effect on SP and PE, with 
respondents indicating PM values more likely to SP, but less likely to 
believe government should pass laws to protect the environment (PE). 
AOC shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP, ES and PE. PB 
shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, SP, GG, ES and PE. FB shows 
a positive statistical effect on WTS. LCI shows a positive statistical effect 
on SP and PE. LCE shows a positive statistical effect on WTS.10 KC 
shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, and SP. KS only shows a 
positive statistical effect on CB.11 
                                                                
10
LCI and LCE have a high correlation (B=.472). Due to this high correlation, this may 
weaken the statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) indicated that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
11Know cause of environmental issues (KC) and know solution of environmental issues 
(KS) have a high degree of correlation (B=.631). Due to this high correlation this may 
weaken the statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) indicated that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
48 
 
Table 3 
The Effect of Social Structural and Social Psychological Variables on 
Behavior and Intention 
 Willingness 
to 
Sacrifice     
(WTS) 
Consumer 
Behavior 
(CB) 
Sign 
Petition 
(SP) 
Member 
of 
Group 
(GG) 
Environmental 
Spending 
(ES) 
Protect the 
Environment 
(PE) 
      
Gender       
Male  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female -0.05  0.18*  0.55* 0.90 0.11 -0.09 
Race       
Black -0.07 -0.05 1.09 0.71 0.11 0.13 
White  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age       
Baby Boomers  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation X -0.02  -0.26** 0.74 1.31  -0.04 -0.17 
Generation Y  0.13 -0.20 1.57 1.09 0.24 -0.24 
Income       
Above Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Below Median  -0.04 0.09 0.75 0.46 -0.03 0.18 
Education  0.04* 0.03 1.11* 1.05 -0.05 0.03 
Liberalism 0.01 0.03 1.28*  1.46* 0.08 0.10 
Religion       
Protestant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Catholic  -0.05  0.21* 1.47 0.94 -0.07 0.15 
No Religion 0.19 0.14 0.71 0.23   0.76* -0.08 
Religious Strength -0.01 0.08 0.75 0.58 0.17 0.06 
Party Identification       
Democrat 0.04 -0.01 1.07 0.80 -0.09  0.02 
Independent 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Republican -0.10 -0.02 1.06 0.95 -0.20* -0.10 
Postmaterialism 
(PM) 
0.00 -0.02 1.31* 1.13 -0.04   -0.23** 
Awareness of 
Consequences 
(AOC) 
  0.45**    0.49** 1.55* 1.17    0.47** 0.20 
Progress Beliefs 
(PB) 
  0.24** 0.02 1.15 1.19     0.34**    0.25** 
Fragility Beliefs 
(FB) 
  0.21** 0.06 0.90 1.29 -0.06 0.07 
Locus of Control 
(Internal) (LCI) 
0.03   0.11**  1.47** 1.51  0.12    0.20** 
Locus of Control 
(External) (LCE) 
 0.11* 0.02 1.15 1.09 -0.09 0.07 
Know Cause (KC)   0.14*  0.12* 1.12 1.15  0.13 0.09 
Know Solution (KS)  0.02 0.11  1.39* 1.17 -0.09 0.07 
R2    .31   .21   .17   .06    .24   .23 
N 636 618 646 654 323 491 
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Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are 
interpreted as odds-ratios. 
*p<.10,** p<.05 
In Table 3, controlling for both the social structural and social 
psychological variables adds a significant amount of predictive strength 
to the behavior and intention items. However, these two groups explain 
behavioral intention more so than past behavior. Some interesting 
highlights from this table include: 
 Social psychological variables are stronger predictors of behavior 
and intention.  
These variables explain between 6%-31% of the variance in behavior 
indicators. Social psychological variables added an additional 2%-19% of 
variance to the social structural items for behavioral indicators. Race in 
this table is not predictive of any items regarding behavior and intention. 
Gender only shows a positive statistical effect on SP, in which females 
are less likely than males to engage in this behavior. Age only shows a 
positive statistical effect on CB in which Generation X (30-44) 
respondents are less likely than Baby Boomers (45-65) to engage in 
environmental behaviors. Income does not show any statistical effect on 
the behavioral indicators. Education shows a positive statistical effect on 
WTS and SP. Liberalism shows a positive statistical effect on SP and GG. 
Religion shows a positive statistical effect on CB and ES. Catholics are 
found more likely than Protestants to engage in CB, while those who 
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identified with No Religion are more likely than Protestants to believe we 
are not spending enough on the environment (ES). Religious strength 
and spiritual person do not show any statistical effect on the behavioral 
indicators. Party identification only shows a statistical effect on ES, in 
which Republicans are less likely than Independents to think the 
government is spending not enough money on the environment (ES). PM 
shows a positive statistical effect on SP and PE, with respondents 
indicating they are PM more likely to SP, but less likely to believe 
government should pass laws for people and business to protect the 
environment (PE). AOC shows a positive statistical effect on all behavior 
and intentions except GG. PB shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, 
ES and PE. FB only shows a positive statistical effect on WTS. LCI shows 
a statistical effect on CB, SP and PE. LCE only shows a positive 
statistical effect on WTS. KC shows a positive statistical effect on WTS 
and CB. KS only shows a positive statistical effect on SP.  
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Table 4 
The Effect of Social Structural and Postmaterialism on 
Environmental Beliefs 
 Awareness of 
Consequences 
(AOC) 
Fragility 
Beliefs 
(FB) 
Progress 
Beliefs 
(PB) 
Locus of 
Control 
(Internal) 
(LCI) 
Locus of 
Control 
(External) 
(LCE) 
Know 
Cause 
(KC) 
Know 
Solution 
(KS) 
       
Religious Strength -0.14 -0.06 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.10 
Spiritual Person     0.27** 0.05 -0.06   0.25**    0.20* 0.13 0.15 
Religion        
Protestant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Catholic 0.16  0.38* 0.29 -0.21  -0.10 -0.08 0.22 
No Religion 0.12 0.64 0.02 0.34  0.02 0.35 0.19 
Race        
Black 0.19    0.82**   -0.94**  -0.76** -0.46*  -0.68** -0.27 
White 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gender        
Male  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female    0.38** -0.04 0.18 0.25 0.11   -0.77**  -0.43** 
Age        
Baby Boomers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation X -0.02 0.14 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.29 
Generation Y -0.21 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.28 
Income        
Above Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Below Median    0.38**   0.40** -0.18  -0.45** -0.02 -0.24 0.02 
Education  -0.08**  -0.09**   0.15**    0.19**     0.14**   0.13**    0.13** 
Liberalism   0.21**   0.16**   0.20** 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.07 
Party Identification        
Democrat    0.30** 0.00   0.18* 0.05 -0.02    0.22** 0.08 
Independent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Republican -0.14 -0.01 -0.08 0.03  0.00  0.20*  0.19* 
Postmaterialism (PM) -0.10 -0.07 0.14*  0.16*   0.14*  0.17* 0.15* 
R2    .19   .12  .17   .16    .08   .14   .09 
N 682 730 747 745 751 743 745 
Note: AOC, FB, PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. 
 *p<.10,** p<.05 
 In Table 4, environmental beliefs are used as the dependent 
variable to determine their predictive ability given social structural items 
and postmaterialism (PM). Some highlights from this table include the 
following: 
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 Education tends to be the most statistically significant predictor of 
environmental beliefs 
 Age is a poor predictor of environmental beliefs. 
 Social structural items and postmaterialism account for between 
8%-19% of the variance in environmental beliefs. In this table, religious 
strength does not show any statistical effect on environmental beliefs. 
Religion only shows a statistical effect on FB, with Catholics more likely 
to hold FB than Protestants. This may contribute to the finding that 
Catholics are more likely than Protestants to engage in CB. Religious 
strength does not show a statistical effect on any of the environmental 
beliefs. However, those respondents indicating they are a spiritual person 
are associated with three of the environmental beliefs: AOC, LCI and 
LCE. Race is astrong predictor of environmental beliefs, although the 
results are not consistent. Blacks are more likely than whites to hold FB, 
however, they are less likely than whites to show a positive statistical 
association with PB, LCI or KC. Gender also does not tell a complete 
story, with females more likely than males to hold a high AOC, yet less 
likely to hold KC or KS. However, this follows the findings in the past 
literature that on average women tend to be more concerned about the 
environment, yet know less about the causes and solutions to 
environmental issues. Age cohort turns out to be a poor predictor of 
environmental beliefs, showing no statistical effects. Income shows a 
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statistical effect on three of the environmental beliefs. Below median 
income individuals are more likely than higher income individuals to 
have an increased AOC and FB, yet are less likely to display LCI. Further 
insight to this finding could be due to the workplace environment or 
living environment of individuals. Education is one of the strongest 
predictors of environmental beliefs. Higher levels of education shows a 
positive statistical effect on PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS. However, higher 
levels of education show a negative statistical effect on AOC and FB. 
Liberalism shows a positive statistical effect on AOC, FB and PB. Party 
identification is predictive of several environmental beliefs. Democrats 
are more likely to display a higher AOC, PB and KC. However, 
Republicans are more likely to hold KC and KS. Lastly, PM shows a 
statistical effect on PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS. 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
My analysis both supports and refutes the previous research. 
Examining the change in the pseudo R2 indicates the significant 
influence of social psychological variables on behavior and intention. 
Moreover, social psychological variables add the most additional variance 
to WTS (21%) and the least variance to GG (2%). The median increase in 
predicative ability was 10%, which is identical to the findings by Dietz et 
al. (1998). For four out of the six equations, adding the social 
psychological power more than doubled predictive power, and tripled 
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predictive power for two behavioral intention items (WTS and ES). This 
indicates the influence of social psychological variables on environmental 
behavioral intentions.  
Overall, many of the findings are similar to those found in the 
Dietz et al. (1998) study in which the social structural variables are not 
operating through the social psychological variables.12 This is due to the 
social structural patterns remaining the same, although losing a 
significant amount of predictive power. However, several of the social 
psychological variables - LCI, LCE and KS - gain predictive ability 
through the inclusion of social structural variables. In Table 3, LCI gains 
predictive ability in CB and PE, and LCE gains predictive ability in WTS. 
KS gains predictive ability in SP. 
 Gender and race are found to be weak predictors of environmental 
behavior and intention, with the only statistical effect found among 
females who are less likely than males to SP. This differs from the Dietz 
et al. (1998) study which found that gender and race maintained several 
statistical effects. Females were less likely than males to have a positive 
statistical effect on WTS, yet were more likely than males in CB. Race 
was found to be predictive of both CB and ES, with blacks more likely 
than whites to engage in these behavior and intentions.   
                                                                
12
 However, in Table 3, No Religion does gains a statistical effect on ES.  
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 Likewise, both studies found that females tend to have a higher 
AOC in comparison to males, while the Dietz et al. (1998) study also 
found a statistical effect with females having higher FB. Additionally, this 
study also controlled for KC and KS in which females were less likely 
than males to hold these beliefs. For policy decision makers, this fact 
shows that methods of education and information should be directed at 
women, while males, for example, are more likely to be influenced 
through affect and imagery.  
 In this study blacks were found more likely than whites to hold FB, 
yet were less likely than whites to feel that human progress was harming 
the environment (PB). These findings followed the results from the Dietz 
et al. (1998) study. However, this study additionally found blacks less 
likely than whites to feel they can do anything about the environment 
(LCI); more likely than whites to feel that everyone must play their role to 
do something about the environment (LCE), and less likely than whites to 
KC. For policy decision makers, empowering blacks to realize the power 
of their decisions to affect the environment, and increasing knowledge of 
environmental causes is important to influencing future behavior and 
intention. Moreover, the finding that blacks are less likely than whites to 
view human progress as more important than the environment supports 
the hypothesis that while on a whole blacks may be more concerned 
about the environment, there are many other issues that compete for 
their resources.  
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Age only showed a statistically significant effect on CB in which 
individuals age 30-44 (Generation X), were less likely than those age 45-
65 (Baby Boomers). Dietz et al. (1998) found similar patterns with CB, 
and additionally that those < 34 were less likely than those between ages 
35-47 to SP and more likely to believe the government should be 
spending more money to protect the environment (PE). Additionally, they 
found that those individuals > 47 believe the government should be 
spending less on the environment (ES) than those age 35-47. 
Age did not show any statistical effect on any of the social 
psychological variables in this study, yet Dietz et al. (1998) found two 
statistical effects. Those aged 47 and older were less likely than those age 
35-47 to have a high AOC, and were less likely to view the environment 
over human progress (PB). Moreover, the lack of statistical effects on age 
and behavior and intention as well as environmental beliefs, suggests 
that age has become less significant in determining environmental 
beliefs. However, the behavior and intentions which are most age specific 
continue to be CB.  
Income, which was not controlled for in the Dietz et al. (1998) 
study, show no statistical effect on any of the behavior and intention 
variables. However, income was a strong predictor of environmental 
beliefs. Those individuals below the median income were more likely that 
those above median income to have a high AOC; more likely to hold FB; 
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yet, less likely to feel that there is anything they can do about the 
environment (LCI). These statistical effects indicate that what while below 
income individuals have stronger environmental beliefs, they lack the 
feeling of knowing there is something they can do to help the 
environment. Similar to the findings with race, in which blacks showed a 
higher concern for the environment, but lack of feeling there is anything 
they can do, policy decision-makers should direct strategies which focus 
on the underlying values and beliefs that orientate individuals toward 
increased LCI.  
Education shows a positive statistical effect on WTS and SP, in 
which the more educated are more willing to engage in these behavior 
and intentions. Dietz et al. (1998) found education to show a statistical 
effect on WTS, SP, and GG. Likewise, in this study education was found 
to be one of the strongest predictors of environmental beliefs. The more 
educated were more likely to view the environment over human progress 
(PB); more likely to have a strong internal (LCI) and external locus of 
control (LCE); and more likely to KC and KS. However, education showed 
a negative statistical effect on AOC and FB. These results share some 
consistency with the Dietz et al. (1998) study which found that education 
showed a negative statistical effect on FB.  
This proves that education is a far better predictor of 
environmental beliefs than it is of environmental behaviors and 
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intention. Moreover, the consistency between studies that more years of 
education equates to more concern about the environment is muddled by 
the negative statistical effects on AOC and FB.  
Liberalism only showed a statistical effect SP and GG – both 
political behaviors. In Dietz et al (1998), liberalism was significantly more 
predictive of behavior and intentions, in which the more liberal showed 
positive statistical effects on all behavior and intention items. Thus, the 
decrease in these statistical effects shows the decline in political ideology 
in determining behavioral intentions and most past behaviors. In both 
this study and Dietz et al. (1998), liberalism was a strong predictor of 
environmental beliefs. Likewise, liberalism showed a positive statistical 
effect on AOC, FB and PB. In Dietz et al. (1998), a similar pattern was 
found with liberalism showing a positive statistical effect on AOC and PB.  
Religion was a poor predictor of environmental behavior and 
intentions as well as environmental beliefs. The only statistical effect was 
that Catholics were more likely than Protestants to engage in CB. 
Likewise, it was found that Catholics hold FB higher in comparison to 
Protestants. Similarly, the Dietz et al. (1998) study found Catholics more 
likely to engage in CB and more likely to SP then Fundamentalists. 
Additionally, their study found Catholics, moderate and liberal 
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Protestants, and those with no religion to be more likely than 
Fundamentalists to hold PB.13       
Lastly, PM shows a statistical effect on SP and PE, where those 
who identified with PM values were more likely to SP and more likely to 
believe people/business should decide for themselves how to protect the 
environment (PE). In Dietz et al. (1998), PM shows a statistical effect on 
WTS, CB and SP where those who identified with PM values were more 
likely to engage in these behavior and intentions.  
PM was also a strong predictor of environmental beliefs in this 
study. Those who identified with PM values were more likely to hold a 
LCI, LCE, KC and KS. Dietz et al. (1998) found that those who identified 
as PM were less likely to hold FB, but not PB.  
Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this thesis provides new insights into the 
literature on environmentalism as well as on perceptions of risk and 
communication strategy. This study indicates that when determining 
what influences environmental behavior and intentions as well as 
environmental beliefs, social psychological variables remain the strongest 
predictors. As such, this conclusion is supported by the findings of Dietz 
                                                                
13
 In the Dietz et al. (1998) study, religious sect was analyzed through the following 
categories: Fundamentalist, Moderate Protestant, Liberal Protestant, Catholic and No 
Affiliation. 
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et al. (1998), and further suggests that many of the social-structural 
effects that existed in their study are overshadowed by the social 
psychological variables.  
None the less, this study finds supports the conclusions in Dietz et 
al. (1998), which suggests data sets of this size should include more 
measures of attitude, belief and worldview variables. These include the 
worldview orienting dispositions measured in cultural theory; moral 
norm activation; risk perception; and affect and imagery. Research from 
Lesierowitz (2006), Peters & Slovic (1996), and Dake (1991,1992) have 
included appropriate scales examining perceptions of risk and affect and 
imagery. These scales will provide more accuracy and context in how 
social psychological variables operate, thus influencing behavior. 
 
Additionally, the significance that social psychological factors play 
in a person’s attitudes, intentions and behavior towards the environment 
leads back to the psychological and cultural underpinnings of risk 
perception. This analysis provides context into the values and beliefs that 
guide individual concern for the environment and the subsequent 
behaviors and intentions with which they correspond. 
As it was previously mentioned, some experts have argued that the 
public should be removed from the risk regulating process entirely. 
However, regulating risks requires the cooperation of a collective body of 
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lay people. Likewise, as cultural theory has established, people tend to 
evaluate risks as members of a community. The research on risks 
described in this essay has had an overwhelming tendency to avoid the 
experimental context of risk - that is, actual people considering real 
threats to their well-being or other peoples' well being. Laboratory 
experiments of cognitive psychologists represent risk perception within 
the bounded rationality of experts. As a result, these models reveal more 
about the cognitive context of the research rather than about how a 
person constructs and experiences risk in a social context (Dake, 1992). 
Understanding how the public views risks requires understanding the 
social context of the values and beliefs they place on these issues. 
Therefore, the public must be a part of the risk regulation process, and 
as such, organizations and professionals must engage in more effective 
and efficient risk communication strategies acknowledging these 
cognitive and cultural perceptions. 
Therefore, the risk communication process must not focus only the 
content of the message, but also the overall process of how risks are 
communicated to the public. As O'Leary et al. (1990) state in their 
chapter on risk communication in "Managing the Environment: 
Understanding the Legal, Organizational and Policy Challenges," there 
are four elements of the risk communication process that managers need 
to understand: the source of the message; the design of the message; the 
delivery channel; and the target recipients. 
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While government agencies and industry are the common sources 
of risk communication messages, many other groups, including 
environmental advocates, communication groups, and the media play 
important roles. Now, these sources are even more prominent in the age 
of technology, where information is more available to anyone who seeks 
it. Therefore, each of these groups represents a different dimensionality 
to the complexity of the risk decision-making process. Moreover, it 
underscores the necessity of approaching risk problems through a 
platform that is sustainable and adaptable to the complexities that these 
issues present. As the public perceives each of these channels of risk 
communication differently, it is important that public organizations 
continue to build public trust, specifically through transparency. This 
involves understanding how their own values and beliefs align with the 
public as well as understanding the cognitive rationality of the public 
they look to inform.  As such, these organizations must cooperate in 
defining how the message is formulated. 
Experts must balance how to take highly technical, quantitative 
analysis and put it in terms that are understood by the lay public. The 
findings of this analysis suggest that understanding individual behavior 
and intention as well as environmental beliefs is largely based on social 
psychological characteristics. Essentially, the design of the message 
becomes a process of understanding the cognitive psychological 
literature that explains how individuals filter complex information to 
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make quick decisions, but also the cultural rationality that exists in the 
community where the risk is to be communicated and the values and 
beliefs that enable citizens to see their side of the problem. To know how 
to solve social problems, it becomes essential to understand the society 
in which you look to influence.  
As such, the delivery channel of the information must take into 
account the social, political, and economic context in which the risk 
information is conveyed. This has several implications: how are 
individuals likely to perceive the source of the message? Who are the 
leaders within the community that influence public opinion? Which 
institutions are most likely to have credibility in communicating these 
risks? Which media sources does the community rely on? This involves 
the ability tounderstand the many different dimensions that influence 
how the public perceives environmental risk as well as understanding 
through what means that message can be conveyed. 
Therefore, the objective of risk communication must be two-ways. 
Risk communication is not about enabling the public to see rationality 
through the expert’s view, but a deeper understanding of the values and 
preferences of the community. Moreover, this is also a call to individuals 
to continue to challenge what they perceive, value and believe and 
continue to question their assumptions. Therefore, risk communication 
is a participatory process. Viewing the public as partners in the risk 
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communication process will enhance public participation in the political 
and social discourse in how to effectively make decisions about collective 
risk. 
Additionally, Congress and the laws and policies which it enacts 
must require legislation, rules and regulations to be consistent with the 
reality of environmental protection in an imperfect world. A set of rules 
crafted to fit one set of socio-ecological conditions can erode as social, 
economic and technological developments increase the potential for 
human damage to the ecosystems and even the biosphere itself. Thus, 
successful commons governance requires that rules evolve (Dietz et al., 
2003). Policy decision-making must not confine itself to any one-size-fits-
all approach. The process should be a continued effort to evolve around 
the complexity of the public mindset. 
 
Therefore, the way to cope with such massive problems continues 
to follow the edict: think globally, but act locally. Global thinking in 
present terms may raise some of the central questions of risk 
management: how to reconcile technological systems with social values; 
how to develop the consensus about potentially dangerous technologies 
that is necessary for potential growth; and how to establish and maintain 
trust in our protective institutions. Moreover, it guides our idea about 
the way we want to live in this society. Therefore, the continued most 
effective way for our society to learn how to cope with risk is to enable 
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locally based risk management endeavors. This will inevitably change 
how the public must balance risks against the local economic impact of 
controlling them, and involve the local public in a meaningful way in the 
decision-making process. Most importantly, it will develop trust through 
an increase in social capital, which occurs when communities maintain 
frequent communication and dense social networks (Dietz et al., 2003). 
This process involves acknowledging our own individual beliefs and 
values, while being cognizant of how we perceive the risks we face and 
seeking to understand others.  
 
Understanding who fears what and why, and how to influence 
behavioral change and intention is a process that involves a continued 
understanding in not only human cognition, but also in the deeply 
embedded values we share as social beings. This empirical analysis 
sought to further develop how our values and beliefs about the 
environment shape our behavior and intentions, and to what extent 
these values and beliefs differ within social groups. The findings that it 
presents further underscore the conclusion of Dietz et al. (1998) that our 
attitudes, intentions and behavior operate primarily through social 
psychological constructs. Moreover, comparing the results from these 
studies, which expand over 17 years, indicate the influence that social 
psychological variables have taken over common social structural 
groupings. Additionally, this may suggest the divergence of common 
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social structural groups into more dynamic, complex groupings. Our 
tendency as individuals to process certain information and disregard 
other, and to find great difficulty in balancing our subjective process of 
reason and gut reaction, facts and feelings, has lead to our society 
producing fears in light of the facts. Effective risk regulation requires all 
sectors of society and the public to not only become more aware of the 
biases we face as individuals, but develop collective solutions to mutually 
defined risks. Understanding the environmental risks our society faces 
will continue to be a difficult question to answer given the difficulty in 
understanding the individual balance of emotion and cognition as well as 
the deeply imbedded social values and beliefs which orientate our 
decisions. Answers to complex policy issues such as managing 
environmental risks should not seek to be right or wrong, but instead 
should center on trade-offs around what we value as individuals and as 
groups. While perfect decisions are not the goal, we can continue to 
strive to better understand the values we share collectively, and in the 
process better understand ourselves and others.  
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APPENDIX I. 
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Mean S.D. Alpha if item deleted Alpha N
Awareness of Consequences Index 3.66 0.69 0.81 1216
In general, do you think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by 
climate change is… 3.44 1.14 0.71 1304
In general, do you think that air pollution caused by cars is… 3.53 0.89 0.79 1362
In general, do you think that nuclear power stations are… 3.40 1.13 0.57 1311
In general, do you think that air pollution caused by industry is… 3.89 0.85 0.84 1369
In general, do you think that pesticides and chemicals used in farming are… 3.65 0.90 0.72 1354
In general, do you think that pollution of America's rivers, lakes, and streams 
is… 3.96 0.88 0.71 1368
Scale range from 1 (not dangerous at all for the environment) to 5 (extremely 
dangerous for the environment)
Mean S.D. Alpha if item deleted Alpha N
Progress versus the Environment Index 2.95 1.19 0.62 1373
People worry too much about human progress harming the environment. 3.04 1.05 0.85 1349
We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about 
prices and jobs today. 2.95 1.19 0.85 1373
Scale range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree)
Mean S.D. Alpha if item deleted Alpha N
Fragility of Nature Index 2.87 0.79 0.52 1328
Almost everything we do in modern life harms the environment. 3.23 1.03 0.83 1360
Economic growth always harms the environment. 2.52 0.88 0.81 1341
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
Mean S.D. N
Postmaterialism
What do you think should be America's highest priority, the most important thing it 
should do? Second most important thing it should do? 1.52 0.999 1166
Scale range from 0 (none of America's priorities should be postmaterialistic values) to 
3 (America's highest priorities should be postmaterialistic values)
Mean S.D. N
Locus of Control (Internal)
It is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment. 3.25 1.21 1362
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
Mean S.D. N
Locus of Control (External)
There is no point in doing what I can for the environment unless others do the same. 3.43 1.13 1379
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
Mean S.D. N
Know Solution
How much do you feel you know about the solutions to environmental problems? 2.52 1.02 1357
Scale range from 1 (know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal)
Mean S.D. N
Know Cause
How much do you feel you know about the causes of environmental problems? 2.94 1.07 1359
Scale range from 1 ( know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal)
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APPENDIX II. 
BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS 
 
 
 
Mean S.D. Alpha if item deleted Alpha N
Consumer Behavior Index 2.19 0.65 0.77 1252
How often do you make a special effort to sort glass or cans or plastic or papers for 
recycling? 2.90 1.08 0.53 1373
How often do you make a special effort to buy fruits or vegetables grown without 
pesticides or chemicals? 2.15 0.98 0.66 1364
How often do you cut back on driving for environmental reasons? 1.80 0.87 0.72 1303
How often do you reduce the energy or fuel you use at home for environmental 
reasons? 2.28 0.98 0.74 1395
How often do you choose to save or re-use water for environmental reasons? 1.90 0.96 0.66 1397
How often do you avoid buying certain products for environmental reasons? 2.10 0.91 0.73 1385
Scale range from 1 (never) to 4 (always)
Mean S.D. Alpha if item deleted Alpha N
Willingness to Sacrifice Index 2.84 1.08 0.84 1302
How willing would you be to much higher prices in order to protect the environment? 3.08 1.22 0.86 1343
How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment? 2.68 1.28 0.88 1350
How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect 
the environment? 2.73 1.26 0.81 1354
Scale range from 1 (not at all willing) to 5 (very willing)
Mean S.D. N
Sign Petition
In the last five years, have you signed a petition about an environmental issue? 0.17 0.37 1381
Scale range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes)
Mean S.D. N
Member of Group
Are you a member of any group whose aim is to preserve or protect the 
environment? 0.06 0.23 1400
Scale range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes)
Mean S.D. N
Protect the Environment
Government should let (people/business) decide for themselves how to protect 
the environment, even if it means they don’t always do the right thing, or 
governemnt should pass laws to make (people/business) protect the 
environment, even if it interferes with (people/business) right to make their own 
decisions? 0.75 0.35 984
Scale range from 0 (government should let (people/business) decide) to 1 
(government should pass laws)
Mean S.D. N
Environmental Spending
Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount on 
improving or protecting the environment? 2.45 0.71 976
Scale range from 1 (too much) to 3 (too little)
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APPENDIX III. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
Mean S.D. N
Gender
Male 0.44 0.50 2014
Female 0.56 0.50 2014
Mean S.D. N
Race
Black 0.17 0.37 1861
White 0.83 0.37 1861
Mean S.D. N
Education 13.45 3.14 2009
Scale range from 0-20 years
Mean S.D. N
Age
Baby Boomers (45-65) 0.45 0.50 1651
Generation X (30-44) 0.33 0.47 1651
Generation Y (< 30) 0.22 0.42 1651
Mean S.D. N
Income
Above Median Income 0.51 0.50 2014
Below Median Income 0.49 0.50 2014
Median income recorded was $50,000
Mean S.D. N
Religion & Spirituality
Protestant 0.54 0.50 1818
Catholic 0.27 0.44 1818
No Religion 0.2 0.40 1818
Religious Strength
1
1.92 1.08 1933
Spiritual Person
2
2.14 0.96 1933
1
Scale range from 1 (somewhat strong) to 3 (strong)
2
Scale range from 1 (not spiritual at all) to 4 (very spiritual)
Mean S.D. N
Party Identification
Republican
1
0.66 1.03 1979
Independent 0.18 0.39 1979
Democrat
1
1.01 1.18 1979
1
Scale range from 1 (Independent, close to (Democrat/Republican)) to 3 (strong 
(Democrat/Republican))
Mean S.D. N
Political Ideology
Liberalism 3.92 1.46 1944
Scale range from 1 (very conservative) to 7 (extremly liberal)
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